Behavioral Taxation
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Experimental studies on the influence of taxation on retirement provisionThe research project addresses the question of how tax incentives should be designed in order to effectively increase private pension provision. The question will be investigated using laboratory experiments. The specific objectives are: - To investigate the influence of pension taxation on labour supply decisions - To investigate the influence of pension taxation on the amount of savings - To investigate the influence of pension taxation on the level of risk chosen for savings investmentsLed by: Prof. Dr. Kay BlaufusTeam:Year: 2019
Tax Compliance and international Tax Planning
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Tax Compliance ManagementThe aim of the project is to develop a scientific understanding of the economic consequences of the design of tax compliance management systems and (as far as possible) to quantify the consequences on the basis of empirical data. Among other things, the following questions will be investigated: - How widespread are tax compliance management systems currently in practice and how are they designed? - Are there international differences between countries in terms of the prevalence, design and requirements of tax compliance management systems? - What are the links between the introduction of cooperative tax audits and tax compliance management systems?Led by: Prof. Dr. Kay BlaufusTeam:Year: 2019
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Learning from strategic interactions between corporate accounting and taxationIn this research project, we address the question of the extent to which the evaluation of company information in the course of tax audits and the incentive structure of tax auditors interact with the tax avoidance behaviour of companies, their commercial reporting and the preparation and processing of internal company information. To address this research question, game theory and principal-agency theory analyses as well as experimental laboratory studies will be conducted. Of particular interest is the fact that the economic agents involved (entrepreneurs, managers, tax auditors and auditors) do not know the exact objective functions of their counterparts in reality, so that there is uncertainty regarding the exact audit costs and incentives of auditors, for example. Economic agents must therefore learn from their own observations based on experience. In order to model this theoretically, known inspection games must be expanded to include the relevant institutions and supplemented with uncertainty regarding the objective functions.Led by: Prof. Dr. Kay Blaufus, Prof. Dr. Jens Robert Schöndube, Prof. Dr. Stefan WielenbergYear: 2019
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Efficiency of tax auditsThe project aims to empirically investigate the factors that influence the efficiency of tax audits. Of particular interest here are the gathering of information on audit priorities, resulting additional findings, individual time consumption, the selection criteria for an audit, and the timeliness of the audit.Led by: Prof. Dr. Kay BlaufusTeam:Year: 2019
